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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP

APO 655

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

(Short title: FUSAG CI SOP)

SECTION I COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

SECTION II CENSORSHIP

ANNEXES

"A" - CI INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTS

"B" - COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"C" - SPECIAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE UNITS

"D" - DETECTION OF ILLICIT RADIO TRANSMITTERS

"E" - CI LABORATORY

"F" - SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION

"G" - SECURITY EXAMINATION AND HANDLING OF CIVILIANS

"H" - LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND SUSPECT ORGANIZATIONS

"I" - COUNTER SABOTAGE

"J" - TRAVEL CONTROL

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF DIVISION CP

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abwehr	Secret Intelligence Service of German High Command
CA (G-5)	Civil Affairs (Civil Affairs Division)
Com Z	Communications Zone
CI	Counter Intelligence
CIB	Counter Intelligence Branch (G-2 Section)
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
CID	Criminal Investigation Division (PM)
DF	Direction Finding (Radio)
ESIS	Enemy Secret Intelligence Services
FBSO	Fleet Base Security Officer (Br.)
IS9 (WEA)	Intelligence Service 9 (Western European Annex)
MII	Military Intelligence Interpreters
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OSS (R&A)	OSS (Research & Analysis)
OSS (X-2)	Counter Intelligence Branch of OSS
P & PW	Publicity and Psychological Warfare
PM	Provost Marshal
SCI	Special Counter Intelligence
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service of the SS)
SF.Det.	Special Force Detachment
SIPO	Sicherheitspolizei (German Security Police)

See also SHAEF, TIS/CM/ECA/2: "Counter Intelligence Glossary, FRANCE and the Low Countries" for abbreviations concerning German and French political, para-military, and police organizations.

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FUSAG CI SOP

SECTION I COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL.

a. Object. The object of Counter Intelligence is to destroy the effectiveness of enemy ~~secret~~ intelligence systems and to prevent sabotage and subversion.

b. Responsibility. Within their respective zones, the commanding generals of armies are responsible for implementing the CI policies established by this headquarters. In particular, they are responsible for:

CIC
Control
by
Army

(1) Controlling the CIC detachments and CIC reserve detachments allotted to them by this headquarters.

(2) Allotting territorial responsibilities between the CIC personnel within their respective zones and insuring continuity of action when one CIC detachment relieves another.

NOTE: Before territorial responsibility for an area is allotted to a CIC detachment of an air force, the approval of this headquarters will be obtained.

(3) Co-ordinating the activities of all CI personnel attached to their headquarters.

(4) Insuring the exchange of CI information between all headquarters (including air and naval) within their respective zones.

2. CI PLANNING PRINCIPLES.

The following principles will be observed in the planning of CI operations:

a. The primary CI task is the active pursuit and liquidation of the enemy intelligence services.

b. Normally, CI personnel are not available to assist in matters which are purely of combat intelligence interest. They are responsible, however, for transmitting to interested agencies all information obtained in the course of CI operations.

c. The restoration of law and order and the imposition of general security controls upon the civil population is essential. CI personnel will give every possible assistance to G-5 and CA detachments in their tasks of establishing and maintaining an efficient civil administration and police force.

3. CI PERSONNEL.

In addition to the CI staff element of G-2/S-2 sections, the following categories of CI personnel are assigned or attached to headquarters as indicated:

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a. CIC detachments. CIC detachments are attached to all division and higher headquarters and operate normally as an integral part thereof. CIC reserve teams are held at this headquarters for allotment as required. Detailed instructions regarding employment of CIC are contained in Annex "B" and elsewhere in this document.

b. Special Interrogators, CIC. It is contemplated that CIC reserve personnel who have undergone special training in CI interrogation will be allotted for employment at army civilian interrogation centers.

c. SCI units. SCI units will be attached to this headquarters and to army headquarters to supply information from special sources concerning the enemy secret intelligence services ~~in their zone~~ to the CI staffs of this headquarters and army headquarters. (See Annex "C").

d. Mobile Radio DF units. Mobile radio DF units ^{to assist in} for locating illicit radio transmitters will be provided by the Signal Intelligence Service. These units operate under the direction of this headquarters. (See Annex "D").

e. CI Laboratory. A CI laboratory will be provided at this headquarters by the Signal Intelligence Service. (See Annex "E").

f. Allied Intelligence Services (other than British). Allied missions will be attached to this headquarters, and it is envisaged that a CI element will be included therein. They will assist CI staffs and personnel in the examination and disposal of suspects, the collection of CI information in the field, and in relations with local authorities.

NOTE: The precise status and responsibilities of allied CI personnel will be the subject of a detailed directive to be issued later. Liaison will not be maintained with allied missions (other than British) in connection with "OVERLORD", nor will any information regarding "OVERLORD" be transmitted to any allied mission until such time as this headquarters may direct.

g. SF staffs and Detachments. SF staffs and detachments will be attached to army headquarters and will be responsible to G-3 sections for coordinating the activities of resistance groups behind the enemy lines with the operations of our forces.

(1) SF staffs contain a CI element whose functions include:

(a) Providing CI information obtained from resistance groups, together with an estimate, based on previous knowledge, of the reliability of the source.

(b) Assisting CI staffs and personnel in matters where their specialized knowledge of resistance groups would be helpful. This includes assistance in establishing the bona fides of persons who claim to have been working for allied underground organizations or resistance groups. It is emphasized that while SF will be able to provide assistance in such cases, the responsibility for determining the bona fides and for recommending as to disposal rests with G-2.

(2) SF liaison officers at corps headquarters operate under the orders

of SF staffs at army headquarters. Their principal duty is to locate and identify organizers of resistance groups, and to escort them to army headquarters.

(3) By arrangement with SF (CI) officers, CI personnel may interrogate the organizers of resistance groups referred to in (2) above in order to obtain tactical CI information. It is important that interrogation of these organizers upon purely political matters should not be conducted by CI personnel in forward areas but should be reserved for specially qualified personnel at armies and this headquarters. Interrogation of the organizers by CI personnel will accordingly be limited to obtaining CI information of immediate tactical value such as the location of recently evacuated enemy offices and buildings and the names of suspect enemy agents or of reliable local informants.

h. Unit Intelligence Officers. In regiments and battalions, S-2 sections will perform CI functions in addition to their combat intelligence duties.

4. CI OPERATIONS.

a. In order to counter the operation of enemy intelligence services and subversive or sabotage elements, CI personnel will be engaged primarily in the security control of the civil population. Therefore, CI personnel normally will not be available to render assistance in military security to the same extent as in the Zone of the Interior.

b. Initially, the Allied Expeditionary Force will enter territory as friends and liberators rather than as conquerors. It is desired to transfer responsibility for civil administration to the civil authorities at the earliest possible date; thus, CI personnel must operate closely with civil police and security personnel. It is to the advantage of the Allied Expeditionary Force as well as to civil authorities that the latter take necessary action wherever practicable. In any area where responsibility for security has been transferred to civil authorities, arrest will not be made by CI personnel without prior agreement of civil authorities, except in cases of emergency and, in such event, the latter will be notified promptly of the action taken. Further instructions will be issued with respect to the division of responsibilities between CI personnel and civil authorities.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Any breach of security or general tendencies which might endanger the success of planned operations will be reported immediately to this headquarters.

b. Appropriate publicity will be given to punishments for security violations.

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SECTION II CENSORSHIP

6. GENERAL.

a. Except as modified below, the provisions of Circular 33, Hq ETOUSA, dated 21 Mar 44, subject: "Censorship Instructions, Postal and Cable" will apply to all military and civilian personnel serving with and accompanying FUSAG on the continent.

b. By agreement with 21 Army Group and with SHAEF concurrence, 21 Army Group will be guided by such censorship directives as are issued by this headquarters, insofar as the 1st US Army is concerned.

7. BASE CENSORSHIP.

Responsibility for the operation of base censorship has been assumed by Hq ETOUSA upon agreement with this headquarters.

8. CIVIL CENSORSHIP.

The censorship of all civilian communications within or between territories occupied or liberated by allied forces is the responsibility of SHAEF.

9. CAPTURED ENEMY MAIL.

Captured enemy mail including that from both enemy "Feldpost" and civil post offices will be collected, bagged, labeled, and forwarded to army G-2 for document section screening, selection, and examination. Mail not selected for examination will be forwarded promptly to SHAEF through intelligence channels. Mail delayed for examination will be forwarded similarly after completion of examination.

Over c.v. mail?

10. PRISONER OF WAR MAIL.

Prisoner of War mail will be bagged, labeled, and delivered to the PW Censorship Section, ETOUSA, APO 887.

11. CENSORSHIP PROCEDURES PRECEDING AN OPERATION.

When any FUSAG unit is alerted, the following procedures will be initiated immediately:

a. All personnel, including officers, will post their personal mail in unit mail boxes only. All possible precautions will be taken by commanders to prevent illicit communications and the posting of mail outside of unit mail boxes.

b. All personal communications will be bagged, labeled "FOR CHIEF BASE CENSOR - SPECIAL MAIL SECTION", and turned over to the APO for delivery to the nearest Base Censor Station.

c. No publicity will be given that more rigid censorship procedures are either contemplated or in effect.

d. All personal telephone, telegraph, and cable facilities will be suspended prior to the time briefing commences.

12. CAMERAS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND FILMS.

Subject to the provisions of Circular 29, Hq ETOUSA, dated 17 Mar 44, subject: "Photography", FUSAG personnel are permitted to carry cameras, and take personal photographs. However, division or higher unit commanders are authorized to place further restrictions upon the use of cameras, as deemed necessary.

13. DISCLOSURE OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

On the continent, all personnel are authorized to write in letters that they are "Somewhere in _____", naming the country. No direct or inferential reference will be permitted which will define the location of the writer more closely than the name of the country. No mention of, or reference to, geographic location will be permitted in cables or telegrams.

14. PERSONAL TELEGRAMS, CABLEGRAMS, AND RADIOGRAMS FROM THE CONTINENT.

No personal telegrams, cablegrams, or radiograms will be sent by FUSAG personnel until commercial cable or radio facilities have been opened under control of US army censors and notice given of procedure for filing messages.

15. MANUSCRIPTS FOR PUBLICATION.

All manuscripts prepared for publication by FUSAG personnel will be referred to press censorship.

16. CENSORSHIP OF WAR CORRESPONDENTS' MAIL.

a. A war correspondent is forbidden to include in personal correspondence any information which may be used as source material or background information for publication in any manner. Any personal correspondence containing such source or background information will be considered as a business communication and will be submitted to press censorship.

b. All personal communications of a war correspondent will be submitted unsealed for examination and censorship to the unit censor of the organization to which the correspondent is attached.

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17. CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS.

No civil communication will be transmitted within or between army zones without prior approval of this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. B. Lewis
H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF	12
21 Army Group	5
ETOUSA	5
FE Com Z	5
AEAF	2
9th AF	5
ANCXF	2
OSS	5

4 Armies	
Armies, 10 each	40
Corps, 5 each	60
Divisions, 3 each	108

FUSAG	
G-1	1
G-2	20
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-5	3
PM	3
P&PW	2
SIS	2
SG/S	4
AG	1
AG (Publ)	3
IG	1
Sp Troops	3
Main Hq, 21 A Gp	1
Rear Hq, 21 A Gp	1

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ANNEX "A"

CI INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTS

1. GENERAL.

Three categories of CI intelligence are available to armies:

a. Background Intelligence. General data regarding the system of administration, police, and political groups and parties of a country, together with indications of the characteristics and sympathies of the people.

b. Detailed Area Intelligence. Addresses and other details of administrative, police, and political organizations in a particular area, together with data concerning the sympathies of the local population, the measures taken by the enemy in the area, and any other facts of CI interest, but excluding data pertaining to suspect or pro-allied individuals.

c. Personality Card Index. This contains names and particulars of known and suspect enemy agents, political suspects, and persons believed to have pro-allied sympathies or likely to prove reliable informants.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES.

CI personnel will provide CA personnel at all levels with any available CI intelligence which may be of value to the latter in the performance of the CA mission, since, in the initial stages, they will rely largely upon CI personnel for advice concerning the reliability of officials. CI personnel will be responsible at all times for expeditious transmission to appropriate authorities of operational or other intelligence gathered as an incidental part of the CI mission. SHAEF will undertake the general coordination of policy regarding the handling of CI data in, from, and to the field, and the allocation of responsibilities and priorities. The distribution of CI intelligence will be the responsibility of the Coordination Section, SHAEF, and the CI staffs of this headquarters and armies as indicated below:

a. The Coordination Section, SHAEF, is responsible for the distribution of CI intelligence covering the whole theater, with special reference to territories not yet liberated.

b. This headquarters is responsible for the evaluation and collation of CI information, and the distribution of CI intelligence relating to territories already liberated, or to areas still occupied by the enemy which may become a zone of operations.

c. Armies are responsible for the collection, evaluation, and collation of CI information, and the distribution of CI intelligence required for the planning of immediate operations, or affecting the day to day security of their own particular zone.

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3. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN THE FIELD.

a. The Coordination Section, SHAEF, will supply this headquarters with amendments and additions to the existing CI Brief, and any additional information relating to territories already liberated or not yet occupied by our forces.

b. This headquarters will transmit to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, all information of general interest or having special reference to territories not yet occupied by allied forces, and such other reports as SHAEF may direct.

c. SCI units at armies and this headquarters will transmit direct through their special communications channels to OSS(X-2) all information relating to their own operations or which is unsuitable for transmission by army signal agencies.

d. CI information derived from captured documents, interrogations, reports, and other sources collected in the field will be studied by armies and their attached SCI units for the purpose of extracting such intelligence as is required for immediate tactical planning or security of their own particular areas. Armies will transmit to this headquarters such CI intelligence and data. Where such data is of immediate interest to other armies, it will also be passed laterally. All particulars, obtained in the field, of known or suspect enemy agents not yet apprehended will be added to the personality card index at army and reported to this headquarters. In cases of urgency, such information may be communicated by radio to FUSAG and other armies through SCI radio channels. Particulars, obtained in the field, of political suspects and reliable informants in areas still occupied by the enemy (or in areas of other armies) will also be furnished to this headquarters. Except in cases of urgency, these may be embodied in the bi-weekly CI report. *Amended*

4. DOCUMENTS SECTIONS.

G-2 documents sections will make available to CI staffs any documents containing CI information. Original documents which are of interest only to CI staffs will be passed to them for disposal. CI documents which are to be forwarded to CI staffs at higher headquarters will be labeled "Attention: CIB, G-2 Section" and handed to documents section for transmittal.

5. CHANNELS OF CI INFORMATION.

The flow of CI information in the field normally will follow the chain of command. Lateral communication between headquarters of flanking armies, corps, or divisions is authorized with reference to detailed information requiring immediate action. See attached chart (Exhibit "A") for graphic representation of CI channels of communications between producer departments, SHAEF Coordination Section, FUSAG, and armies.

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6. CI REPORTS BY ARMIES TO FUSAG.

Armies will report to this headquarters (Attention: CIB, G-2 Section) appropriate CI information. This will be accomplished by means of:

✓ a. Routine Reports. Routine reports will be rendered on the 10th and 25th of each month in triplicate in accordance with attached Exhibits "B" and "C". Reports will be divided into three parts, as shown, each part being separately paged and headed. The date for the first report will be announced later, with subsequent reports as stated above.

b. Special Reports. Special reports will be rendered as may be necessary in cases of urgency or matters of special importance. The following topics are examples:


- (1) German penetration of civil authorities, including police.
- (2) Case reports on important collaborators arrested for security reasons.
- (3) German use of TODT or other para-military personnel for subversive activity.
- (4) German plans for the post-war organization of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in GERMANY or other countries.

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EXHIBIT "A": CHANNELS OF CI INFORMATION



____ SCI COMMUNICATIONS

____ SF COMMUNICATIONS

---- INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

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EXHIBIT "B"

FORM FOR CI BI-WEEKLY REPORTS FROM ARMIES TO FUSAG

PART I: CIVIL CI.

1. ESPIONAGE.

- a. A list of spies apprehended during the period, giving name, place, date, arresting agency, and brief details of action taken. *
- b. A survey of enemy espionage, indicating areas of special activity and main objects of espionage.

2. PRO-GERMAN COLLABORATION.

- a. A list of important collaborators arrested on security grounds, giving name, place, date, party membership (if any), reasons for arrest, arresting agency, disposal, and any further details of special interest. *
- b. A list of prominent officials dismissed on security grounds but not arrested, showing name, post, reasons for dismissal.
- c. A survey of pro-German and anti-allied organizations from the viewpoint of their interest to CI.

3. SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION.

- a. A survey of security restrictions imposed, showing types of restriction, method of promulgation, efficiency of operation, and reactions of population.
- b. Matters of joint concern to G-2 (CI) and G-5 affecting policy.

4. CI RELATIONS.

- a. With allied military security services.
- b. With civil police services.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN TROOPS AND CIVILIANS.

A survey of relations between allied troops and civilians, and a summary of incidents that might form the basis of anti-allied propaganda.

* May be included in Annex shown at Exhibit "C".

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EXHIBIT "B"

PART II: MILITARY CI

1. SABOTAGE.

a. A list of arrested saboteurs, giving same details as in par. 1, a, Part I. *

b. A survey of enemy sabotage, indicating areas of special activity and main objects of sabotage.

2. OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

A statement on the efficiency of measures taken to safeguard information and materiel.

3. CI CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIED AIR FORCES.

4. RUMORS.

A summary of the more important rumors current among troops or civilians concerning locations, strength, morale, supplies, equipment, and plans of our forces.

5. ENEMY PROPAGANDA.

A note on enemy propaganda activity and its effect, if any on allied troops.

PART III: CI STAFFS AND PERSONNEL

A statement showing the areas allotted to CI staffs and the resources of CI personnel available in each area.

* May be included in Annex shown at Exhibit "C"

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EXHIBIT "C"

ANNEX TO TENTH ARMY PERIODIC CI REPORT #30

ARRESTS OF CIVILIAN SUSPECTS

1. ANTELME, Henri Adelbert (Fr) Mayor Ident. (Paris) 134729
Address: 18 Rue du Chien qui Aboie, FONTAINEBLEAU.
Category: Active member of PPF. Prev. Ref.: Buff Card "Q" (Seine et Oise)
Arrested by: Local Police at request of CO, 60 CIC Det., 6 Dec 44.
Disposal: Detained in FONTAINEBLEAU Prison.
Comments: Fanatic leader of PPF, cooperated eagerly with Germans in expeditions against "Maquis", consistently obstructionist in dealings with allied authorities, and suspected of providing PPF members in hiding with identity documents. Considered essential that ANTELME be interned while this area is in the Zone of Operations.
2. DUPONT, Alphonse Andre (Fr) Pharmacist Ident. (Paris) #476538
Address: Moulin Rouge, Bd. Montmartre, PARIS (VIe)
Category: Enemy agent (Saboteur) Prev. Ref.: Special Rep. TA/275/1, 30 Nov 44.
Arrested by: 19 CIC Det. in conjunction with Surete, 2 Dec 44.
Disposal: Delivered direct to Hq Tenth Army under CIC escort, 3 Dec 44.
Comments: Apprehended at Gare du Nord while carrying suitcase containing Abwehr sabotage equipment. DUPONT definitely known to SCI unit, which escorted him to Hq FUSAG, 3 Dec 44.

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ANNEX "B"

CIC

1. GENERAL.

The organization, training, administration, and operations of FUSAG CIC personnel will be in general accordance with the provisions of TM 30-215, WD, dated 22 Sep 43, subject: "THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS".

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. Based upon T/O and E 30-500, dated 24 Jan 44, the CIC detachments in the European Theater of Operations are organized in accordance with the provisions of Section II, GO 36, Hq ETOUSA, dated 27 Apr 44.

b. Reinforcements or replacements to subordinate headquarters normally will be made from CIC reserve teams attached to this headquarters. However, a higher headquarters may withdraw personnel from one or more of its lower echelons to reinforce temporarily another of its headquarters.

3. TRAINING.

All CIC personnel have completed, under WD supervision, certain training courses designed to qualify them in general, for CI work. Personnel in this theater have completed or will complete under ETOUSA supervision certain other training programs intended to qualify them for CI work in the ETO. In addition to this training, commanders of headquarters to which detachments have been attached are responsible for insuring that:

a. Each CIC member maintains a high standard of physical condition and a high state of training as a soldier (emphasis to be placed on training in self-defense, defense against booby traps, etc.), that he is trained in vehicle maintenance, and that he gains a useful knowledge in one or both of the French and German languages.

b. The detachment participates in unit training exercises, and that it develops and engages in exercises designed to simulate forthcoming operations.

4. OPERATIONS.

In commands to which CIC personnel are attached, the AC of S, G-2, assisted by his CI staff officers, is responsible to his commander for general supervision of, and advice pertaining to, the employment of such personnel. Actual employment, however, is a function of command to be exercised through the commanding officer of the CIC detachment.

a. The commanding officer of the detachment is responsible for detailed planning regarding the employment of his detachment personnel. Necessary CI information upon which such planning is to be based will be provided by the G-2 (CI) staff concerned.

b. CIC personnel will be operated in teams of two men or larger groups whenever practicable.

c. It is of the utmost importance that effective CI coverage be maintained continuously in large or important towns and areas. In establishing CI coverage initially for such locations, individual CIC members will develop informant systems, begin investigations of suspect persons, and will become acquainted with and gain confidence of influential local persons whose cooperation is helpful. For these and many other reasons, it is highly desirable that certain of these members continue the maintenance of coverage in the area until relieved by other personnel who have become sufficiently acquainted with the local situation to permit their efficient assumption of control. When such conditions prevail, a small group of the CIC detachment of original jurisdiction should remain in the location in order to turn over to relieving personnel any unfinished local business and to advise in their activities. Only when it becomes apparent that control can be relinquished without jeopardy to the CI coverage will the original group join its detachment.

(1) The above will be considered in planning, and when necessary, the temporary attachment of one or more CIC personnel to be left in charge of a specific town or area may be requested from a higher headquarters.

(a) Whenever practicable Com Z and air force CIC personnel, specially trained in port and airport CI duties, will be made available to tactical commands required to establish initial CI coverage for ports and airports.

(2) Under unforeseen circumstances which may occur during operations, and when it becomes apparent that it will be necessary to relieve lower echelon CIC personnel of responsibility for CI coverage in an area to be vacated by their headquarters, the higher headquarters will make possible the early relief of such personnel by detailing relieving personnel to the area prior to or immediately after movement of the lower headquarters.

d. When the situation demands, detachment commanders by oral orders may place personnel under their command on temporary duty with other detachments upon approval in each case by the appropriate G-2.

e. CIC personnel have full power and authority to arrest or detain any person who violates military security or whose detention is otherwise deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the CI mission.

f. Members of the CIC are authorized to call upon any member of this command for such assistance as may be required in the performance of their assigned duties.

g. Liaison between CI personnel and all other allied intelligence agencies is the responsibility of CI staffs. However, members of the CIC will work in closest cooperation with:

- (1) G-5 and CA detachments.
- (2) Naval, air forces, and Com Z CI personnel.
- (3) Military police and personnel of the office of the provost marshal.
- (4) SCI and SF personnel.
- (5) Radio DF personnel.
- (6) Document collection and evaluation teams.

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- (7) P & PW Officers.
- (8) Attached allied CI staffs and personnel.

h. CIC personnel will be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties, they will be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement. They will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard customs or prohibitions (such as speed limits, access to places "off limits" etc.) nor by the military police or other military agencies. CIC badges and credentials will be honored at all times.

i. CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a CI interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of CI duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of comparable nature.

5. DUTIES.

Included among the operational duties of CIC personnel are the following:

a. Primary Duties in Forward Combat Areas: The primary duty of CIC personnel is to secure CI targets in the area of the objective. Foremost among these targets are:

- (1) Known and suspect enemy agents.
- (2) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the allied forces.
- (3) Offices formerly occupied by the enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.
- (4) Offices of local para-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.
- (5) Centers of communications.
- (6) Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of CI value.

NOTE: Army CI staffs will receive from this headquarters all information on these subjects which is available from special sources and will be responsible for distributing it to CI staffs and CIC of lower organizations as required.

b. Secondary Duties in Forward Combat Areas:

- (1) Making security checks in cooperation with the military police who are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory.
- (2) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the allied cause in order to secure all possible CI information.
- (3) Advising upon and assisting in securing against sabotage all public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the allied forces.
- (4) Checking upon the observance by civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by G-5 and CA detachments.

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(5) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with ordinances.

(6) The seizure of civil communications and arranging for their protection against sabotage until taken over by authorized signal communications personnel as provided in operational orders. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, guarded, and turned over to the proper authorities.

*See
Annex
para 4 x*

(7) Seizing and impounding all civilian and captured enemy mail.

(8) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

(9) Stopping publication of newspapers and other periodicals.

(10) Taking measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and materiel by our own troops.

(11) Transmitting to G-5, PM, or MP officers all information on matters within their purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of co-operation of civil police, and the extent of disorder, looting, and sabotage.

c. Investigative Duties. The CIC will be employed in investigations of:

(1) Espionage
(2) Sabotage
(3) Subversive activity, including rumor mongering and surreptitious issue of enemy propaganda.

(4) Disaffection, treason, and sedition within the US forces.

(5) Violations of security regulations.

(6) (In certain instances involving a CI interest) Personnel of governments of occupied territory who are retained in their official capacities.

(7) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the US government (See par. 6, Annex "F").

d. Miscellaneous Duties:

(1) Cooperating with the corps of military police and other military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of US armed forces. This action will include the recommending of the establishment and the assisting in the maintenance of controls and control systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into territory occupied by this command.

(2) Assisting port CI officers in the discharge of their duties.

(3) Performance of security surveys to determine the safety of communications, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, and other US installations and offices.

(4) Delivery of security lectures to the troops and other provisions for general indoctrination of all US military personnel in security principles.

(5) Surveillance of hotels, bars, restaurants, and other places frequented by US military personnel, and located within or near the area occupied by US troops.

(6) Establishing informant networks.

(7) Keeping the assistant chief of staff, G-2, of their respective commands informed of internal politics, political parties, or subversive groups which may be inimical to the counter intelligence interests of the allied forces.

e. Duties in the Event of Evacuation or Withdrawal:

(1) Searching evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, supply depots, and other installations to insure that documents or any materiel that might be of intelligence value to the enemy have been completely destroyed or removed.

(2) Checking the control of refugees along the routes used by troops to prevent the possibility of enemy infiltration.

f. Duties of Special Groups. Duties of special groups will be in accordance with the needs of their particular assignment in addition to the duties enumerated above.

6. UNIFORM.

CIC personnel are authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces. Normally, they will wear the civilian uniform and the CIC brassard as supplied by ETOUSA. Civilian clothing will not be taken to nor worn on the continent. CIC credentials and badges will be carried as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agent or the successful accomplishment of his mission.

7. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

Normal intelligence channels will be used for all CIC purposes. Lateral communication between detachments is authorized.

8. RECORDS.

In order to facilitate the taking over of areas by relieving CIC detachments, it is essential that the records kept by CIC detachments be uniform and arranged so that they are easily intelligible to persons other than their compilers.

a. For the above purpose:

(1) All detachments will use cards measuring 5" by 8".

(2) Both cards and files will be kept in such a way that a detachment leaving an area can conveniently leave behind the cards and files referring to the area, while taking with it only those files relating to general CI policy and administration.

(3) Particulars noted on the cards should enable an incoming detachment to find readily all relevant information, whether on the card itself or in the files.

b. Files.

(1) Separate files will be kept for:

- (a) Suspect individuals.
- (b) Suspect organizations.
- (c) Security controls.
- (d) Investigations.
- (e) Periodic reports of agents.
- (f) Periodic security reports.
- (g) Security policy.
- (h) Administrative subjects.
- (2) Categories numbered (a) to (e) above will be sub-divided by towns or districts.

(3) In general files, each individual case or organization will be allotted a separate number; e.g. BERNARD Andre - 1, HERMANT Abel - 2. All further correspondence on BERNARD Andre will then be marked with the same initial number followed by a letter: e.g. 1a, 1b, 1c, etc. This will enable correspondence in general files to be kept either chronologically or separately by subjects, so that documents on any one subject can quickly be found or extracted.

(4) Where papers relating to an individual or organization are included in several files, cross reference will be made either in the files or on the relative cards.

(5) When documents relating to a particular case become numerous, they should be removed from the general file and a new individual file should be opened.

c. Card Index.

(1) Particulars of all suspects, informants, suspect organizations, and addresses will be carded and the same territorial division will be made of the card index as is made of the filing system. (See b. (2)).

(2) Cards relating to individual suspects will record:

- (a) Full name, address, and occupation, with any aliases.
- (b) Any details of the case and of action taken which will assist in identification.

(c) Reference to file containing documents of the case, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(d) Cross-reference to names of any associates (unless this is already cross-referred in the relevant files).

(3) Cards relating to informants will record:

- (a) Full name, address, and occupation.
- (b) Reference to files containing any related documents, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(c) How first contacted. *

(d) Estimated reliability. *

(e) Cross-reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.*
*Unless these particulars are already noted in the files.

(4) Cards dealing with parties, organizations, suspect establishments (cafes, etc.) will record:

- (a) Name and address(es).
- (b) Brief case history.
- (c) Reference to any files dealing with it, with numbers of relevant inclosures.
- (d) Cross-reference to individuals connected with it.
- (e) Action taken.

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ANNEX "C"

SCI UNITS

1. GENERAL.

Special information pertaining to Enemy Secret Intelligence Services (ESIS) is available in London but is not suitable for transmission through ordinary intelligence channels. To provide a special channel for such information and to advise regarding the use of the information, SCI units, provided with special communication facilities, will be attached to army headquarters by OSS (X-2).

2. ORGANIZATION.

The SCI unit of an army headquarters will function as part of the CIB, G-2 section, under the immediate supervision of the chief, CIB. It will be administered by the headquarters company, and will consist of: 1 Major, 1 Captain, 1 First Lieutenant, 1 First Sergeant, 1 Staff Sergeant, 3 Technicians 4th Grade, and 2 Privates First Class.

3. COMMUNICATIONS.

SCI units are provided with special communication facilities, including ciphers. They are not dependent upon army signal agencies. Each unit will be in direct contact with its London headquarters, through which all units within the FUSAG zone will be in contact with each other. (See Exhibit "A", Annex "A")

4. FUNCTIONS.

Normally, SCI personnel will function in a staff capacity as advisers without executive responsibilities. They will not be employed on other than CI duties nor will they be employed in areas where there is danger of their capture. Normally they will move with the headquarters to which attached. Their principal duties are to:

- a. Assist CI staffs in compiling and preparing in required form all available information concerning ESIS.
- b. Advise CI staffs in the selection and method of handling counter-espionage targets.
- c. Assist CI staffs in the examination of captured enemy materiel of CI interest and in the interrogation and disposal of captured enemy agents.
- d. Distribute, interpret, and advise upon the use of all CI information received by the unit from other units or from London.

(1) In furtherance of their responsibility to safeguard special sources of information, SCI units retain the right to withhold from any but the chief, CIB, any particular item of information derived from a special source, when action or unrestricted action might jeopardize the security of the

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source or the information.

(2) The ultimate decision as to whether or not action will be taken in the field upon the special information in question rests with the AC of S, G-2, Hq FUSAG, except when an expressed prohibition to take action is issued by OSS in London.

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ANNEX "D"

DETECTION OF ILLICIT RADIO TRANSMITTERS

1. GENERAL.

The detection of illicit radio transmitters is carried out in two phases: (1) the recognition of a radio signal as originating from an enemy agent and its rough location by long range direction finding (DF) which is accomplished in the UK, and (2) the accurate location of the transmitter by local DF which is accomplished in the field by teams of the mobile DF units operating under the direction of the Central Control in the UK.

2. ORGANIZATION.

A mobile DF unit, consisting of six teams, is established at this headquarters and has a direct radio link to the common Central Control in the UK. The personnel of the mobile DF teams at this headquarters form part of a special communications unit. They are technically controlled from the UK, but are under the operational supervision of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, FUSAG. The officer-in-charge of the mobile DF unit will be responsible for their technical employment in such a manner as to best perform the mission directed by the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, FUSAG.

3. FUNCTION.

The function of this unit is to locate, from comparatively short range, the source of a radio signal after receiving information from the Central Control giving the frequency, rough location, and other data. This unit is not suitable for the initial detection of an agent's signal. Except in cases of emergency, no action should be taken in pursuance of local investigations to raid a house or detain a suspect without prior reference to this headquarters (CIB, G-2) where operator personnel will be available to assist in handling these cases.

4. REPORTS.

a. Experience has shown that CI staffs may expect to receive numerous reports alleging illicit use of radio. Many of these reports will be absurd or the result of ulterior motives, but all reports which are not obviously ridiculous must be investigated. An officer experienced in investigating such cases will be available at this headquarters, and all reports which appear to merit investigation will be referred to him through CI channels.

b. Suspect Signals Reported by Signal Corps Units. Reports of suspect signals by ordinary field force units must contain accurate detailed information including the following:

Frequency.

Time.

Radio telephony or telegraphy.

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Call-sign, sample of preamble, and procedure.
Sample of traffic.
Type of receiver on which heard.

c. The above information will be transmitted to the Central Control in the UK over the mobile DF unit radio link.

5. LIAISON.

The mobile DF teams will be required to operate over a wide area, and at all times will work in close liaison with CI personnel. Any necessary liaison for the DF teams with military organizations or civil authorities will be the responsibility of CI personnel. CI staffs of headquarters concerned will be informed when teams of the mobile radio DF unit are operating in their area.

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ANNEX "E"

CI LABORATORY

Round suspects given to Agency.
1. PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.

The principal functions of the CI laboratory at this headquarters are as follows:

- a. Detection and development of secret writing and photography, including microphotographs ("duff").
- b. Examination of suspect property, including cosmetics, soap, toothpaste, polishes, etc. for concealed "duff", secret writing materials, or materials for sabotage.
- c. Detection of alterations and erasures in documents, and recovery of the original wording where possible.
- d. Comparison of handwriting or typescript for detection of forgery, identification of a writer, etc. The originals should be submitted if possible; otherwise a good full-size photograph may suffice.
- e. Recovery of deletions in letters, obliterated official stamps, charred documents, and deciphering of indentations on papers or documents.
- f. Secret opening of letters, packages, and parcels, detection of illicit opening, and secret sealing to prevent illicit opening or to insure detection of illicit opening.
- g. Secret marking for subsequent identification of documents, coins, paper money, stamps, etc.
- h. Ordinary and special photography of objects and documents as required for investigation and record in the foregoing types of work (see par. 2, below).
- i. Technical assistance in interrogation of suspects with reference to secret means of communication.

2. MASS TESTING.

The laboratory is not designed for mass-testing of correspondence or for mass-photography of any kind, and will not be called upon for such work.

3. REQUIRED INFORMATION.

Questions submitted to the laboratory for technical opinion and documents or articles sent for examination will be accompanied by the fullest possible information as to the general nature and significance of the case.

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4. CHAIN OF EVIDENCE.

Attention is directed to the strict necessity for maintaining the chain of evidence where materiel of any nature, submitted for analysis or examination by the laboratory, may be required at a later date for submission or evidence in legal proceedings.

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ANNEX "F"

SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION

1. GENERAL.

The object of CI staffs in insuring the security control of the civil population is to hamper enemy agents and subversive bodies by limiting their movements, communications, and other activities, and to facilitate CI investigations by rendering conspicuous any person behaving in an unusual manner. The internal political affairs of the civil population are not of CI interest unless they amount to a threat to the security of the allied forces.

2. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY.

The security control of the civil population is a command responsibility. G-2 (CIB) is responsible for formulating security policies, but, as a general rule, will co-ordinate and consult with G-5 and PM. G-5 is responsible for implementing security policies through CA detachments and the civil authorities.

3. PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDINANCES.

a. It is envisaged that security restrictions will be imposed upon the local population by French authorities acting on behalf of G-2 and G-5. However, in the event of a breakdown of authority, proclamations which indicate the principles upon which civil government will be carried on in liberated territory may be promulgated by the Supreme Allied Commander. Security restrictions on the civil population will then be announced by ordinances deriving their authority from such proclamations.

b. The drafting of proclamations and ordinances is a responsibility of G-5 who will incorporate the necessary security restrictions recommended by G-2.

c. The initial proclamations issued by SHAEF will not include detailed security restrictions, since the need for these and the ability to enforce them will vary greatly from one area to another. It will be an army responsibility to impose appropriate security restrictions by ordinance within the army zone of operations.

4. SECURITY RESTRICTIONS.

The following are general indications of the nature of the security restrictions which may be imposed:-

a. Identity. It is expected that large numbers of civilians will be without proper identity documents. It will not be possible to issue any type of fresh identity documents until G-5 has restored the civil police services. As soon as circumstances permit, civil police will be directed to organize a system of registration of civilians, and to require all

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civilians to carry prescribed identification papers at all times.

b. Movement. In areas forward of corps straggler lines, all movement by civilian wheeled transport usually will be prohibited, except as authorized by CA for maintaining essential services. As normal conditions are restored, limited public transport services may be resumed.

c. Communications. In the initial stages, no communication services will be made available except for military purposes. As soon as civil communications can be restored, CI staffs will consult with CA and censorship staffs in order to determine the conditions under which postal, telegraph, and telephone service will be made available progressively for civil official and private traffic. Such renewal of civil communications is an essential stage in the restoration of law and order. Often, it may be found advisable to operate a limited postal service under control in order to avoid the development of clandestine communications. Radio transmission by the civilian population will be entirely forbidden, except when directly controlled by this headquarters.

d. Action. Restrictions on action normally will include the imposition of a curfew and the requirement to register or surrender possession of a variety of articles such as arms, explosives, wireless transmitters, carrier pigeons, etc.

5. PASSES AND PERMITS.

a. Passes and permits will be issued to selected civilians in order to allow access to protected premises or to grant exemptions from restrictions. SHAEF (G-5) will issue a single form of pass and permit to be used for all purposes throughout the continent. Its validity will be limited by indorsement so that it can be used only for the purpose and period for which it is granted. Forms will be distributed when available.

b. CA officers through the local police will be responsible for the issue of passes and permits to civilians. G-2 (CIB) will insure, by consultation with G-5, that the conditions of issue of permits and passes meet all security requirements.

c. Supplies of such forms will be issued by CA detachments to CI personnel to enable them to issue permits and passes to civilians in special circumstances. CI personnel will not issue a permit or pass exempting a civilian from security restrictions without the authority of a CI or CIC officer.

6. SECURITY CHECKING OF CIVILIAN LABOR.

a. Security checking of all civilian labor employed by our forces on the continent is impracticable; moreover, the records available to CI personnel will not be sufficient to provide more than a partial check. In cases of particular importance, CIC personnel will be available to conduct investigations. The security of information and installations where

civilian labor is employed must depend; (1) upon measures taken by the employing agency to deprive civilian workers of opportunities for committing sabotage or obtaining information of value to the enemy and (2) on checking through local police, care in the choice of foremen, and any other means of investigation which appear practicable to CI staffs in the area.

b. Civilians will not be employed within headquarters or other places where they have access to classified information or vulnerable installations without previous reference to the appropriate CI staff in the area, who will check with local police. Where there is evidence that an applicant has arrived recently in the army area from an area not covered by the records held at army headquarters, further reference will be made to the records held at this headquarters.

7. SECURITY CHECKING OF ALLIED SECRET AGENTS.

a. An allied secret agent is defined as any person recruited or employed by a US or British agency for the purpose of obtaining information, carrying out subversive operations, or engaging in propaganda by under-cover means. This category does not include confidential informants employed for obtaining information concerning civilian administration, maintenance of public order, or military crimes.

b. Agencies authorized to recruit and dispatch secret agents are: SF detachments, P and PW officers, SI units, and SCI units. These agencies will NOT employ secret agents without the express approval of the AC of S, G-2, (Chief, CIB) this headquarters.

c. Faulty training methods, lack of proper supervision, and inadequate investigation of the bona fides of agents may result in grave danger to the security of operations.

d. In order to check the integrity and background of a prospective agent, the agency concerned will make local inquiries in the area in which the recruit has been residing in order to obtain positive information as to his suitability. A negative report, such as "no derogatory information", is not sufficient and will not be accepted. The agency will then forward the name and particulars of the individual, together with the result of the local investigation, to the agency's unit at this headquarters, preferably by hand, for final processing at this headquarters. Normal AG channels will be used only in case of emergency, and in such case, details will be transmitted in double sealed envelopes, inner envelope marked "TOP SECRET: To be opened only by _____".

e. An agent will not be dispatched to enemy territory if there is reason to believe that he is in possession of information which would prejudice the security of allied operations if it became known to the enemy.

8. SECURITY CHECKING OF CONFIDENTIAL CI INFORMANTS.

CI personnel will institute the same type of check described in par. 7. d. above, before employment of confidential CI informants behind our own lines. This headquarters does NOT desire names or details of local CI informants, but will be fully informed if such informants are intended to circulate within the FUSAG area as a whole.

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ANNEX "G"

SECURITY EXAMINATION AND HANDLING OF CIVILIANS

1. GENERAL.

Examination and interrogation of refugees and displaced persons in forward areas in order to detect enemy agents is a responsibility of CI personnel. Considering the number of refugees, CI staffs, in order to make maximum use of available CI personnel, will have to determine:

a. Where CI personnel can carry out security checks most practically and effectively.

b. What assistance can be obtained from the FM and from local police (through CA) in assembling refugees for examination, in providing facilities for interrogation and detention of suspects, and in escorting suspects from forward areas to places of detention in the rear.

c. How civilians arrested on suspicion by combat troops should be handled, and upon whose authority they should be detained and escorted to the rear.

d. How enemy nationals are to be picked out among refugees, how their arrest is to be effected, where and by whom they are to be detained, and who is to escort them to the place of internment.

2. REFUGEES (FRENCH).

a. General. The numbers of refugees encountered in the forward areas who have been overtaken by allied advance or have crossed enemy lines will vary considerably depending on the density of population, rapidity of advance, intensity of fighting, and stability and strength of the front. In view of the comparatively open country of NW Europe, the flow of refugees is unlikely to be canalized by natural obstacles. Moreover, having been driven off roads required for military traffic by the enemy, refugees will be scattered at the moment of crossing the allied lines, and will not tend to flow along well defined channels until they are at some distance behind the front. From a CI standpoint, it is desirable that: (1) local inhabitants return to their homes as soon as possible, (2) if they have been rendered homeless, that they be accommodated locally or evacuated in organized bodies without delay, and (3) that CA detachments and civil authorities restore order quickly, and reduce uncontrolled movement in the forward areas to a minimum.

b. Handling of Refugees by FM and CA.

(1) Military police are responsible for preventing refugees from congregating on routes required for military traffic, but will not

arrest or evacuate security suspects screened from refugees or displaced persons, except as requested by CI personnel. In the battle area, troops and MPs will direct refugees to the nearest CA collecting point, where they will not be held, but will be organized into parties, instructed where to go, and told what roads are forbidden. Similarly in corps or army areas, MPs will keep them off military routes, directing them to the nearest CA collecting point, transit area, or assembly center (see Exhibits "A" and "B" for location, staff, and functions of these establishments).

(2) CA is responsible for the emergency medical care, feeding, and shelter of refugees, and for their prompt evacuation in organized bodies. To facilitate such organized evacuation, CA will establish CA collecting points, advanced transit areas (optional), transit areas, assembly centers, and internment camps (see Exhibits "A" and "B" for location, staff, and functions of these establishments). Wherever possible, CA will find shelter for refugees by accommodating them locally in villages or farm houses; only where this is impracticable will CA organize advanced transit areas under their own control. At transit areas, refugees who can be disposed of locally, either to their own homes or those of other local residents, will be sifted out and not sent to an assembly center.

c. Resources for CI Examination of Refugees.

(1) A civilian interrogation center, capable of holding 250 civilians will be provided adjacent to or as an annex to the Army PW enclosure. The civilian interrogation center, where specialist CI interrogators will be available, will be the keystone of the organization for examining suspects in each army area. Only security suspects and those required for interrogation on security grounds will be held there. The center will not be used to house ordinary refugees or criminal offenders.

(2) Mobile teams of interrogators from CIC reserve detachments may be sent forward to establish mobile interrogation posts in corps or divisional areas, as indicated in Exhibit "A".

(3) Personnel from allied intelligence services may be available for attachment to army CI staffs to assist in the examination of civilian suspects.

(4) In addition, personnel from local police organizations, obtained through CA officers, should be able to assist in this work under CI personnel supervision.

(5) In the forward areas, near traffic control posts and CA collecting points, CI personnel, with the assistance of local police, will establish security control posts for initial examination of refugees; when the number of refugees passing through these posts is very large, functions will have to be limited to "snap checks" (as near to 100% as possible).

d. Handling of Refugees from Enemy Lines. Refugees crossing from enemy lines will include persons merely anxious to escape from the immediate battle area, persons attempting to return to their homes in the allied area, and persons who possess no home in the area, but are

anxious to escape from enemy occupied territory. Such civilians must be segregated from those who have merely been overtaken by an allied advance. This segregation in the forward areas may be accomplished at security control posts by CI personnel and local police. Since most of these refugees will be found after examination to be harmless and even helpful, CI personnel in forward areas should avoid giving them the impression that they are suspect. They should be made to think that their story is accepted, and that they are being sent back either to give information or for welfare purposes. If they can be made to believe this, it will be unnecessary usually to provide an armed escort. The same impression should be given to troops who are required to accompany parties of civilians. Refugees who have come through enemy lines will be evacuated as outlined below until their status has been clarified; when cleared they will be turned over to CA for evacuation through regular refugee channels.

(1) Refugees will be sent back along PW routes to mobile division and corps interrogation posts (see Exhibits "A" and "B") to be interrogated and classified. Where doubt still exists, the refugees will be sent back to the civilian interrogation center.

(2) It is undesirable to mix civilians with PWs, and facilities for escorting and transporting civilians under close supervision will be very limited, particularly in advance of corps PW enclosures; accordingly CI personnel will consult with PM regarding the best means for sending civilians back, and for keeping them separated from PWs. Maximum use should be made of military transport, such as ration and ammunition trucks returning empty from the front, as a means of conveyance. Since existing instructions forbid the conveyance of civilians in military transport, instructions will have to be issued to drivers that they may accept such passengers on the written authority of CI personnel.

(3) Before evacuating a civilian to the civilian interrogation center an arrest report form will be completed concerning the suspect, stating his particulars and the circumstances and reason for his detention. The arrest report form will be completed in duplicate, the original accompanying the escort of the suspect, to be handed to the staff of the detaining installation (PW enclosure or civilian interrogation center), and the duplicate to be retained by CI personnel. The local CA detachment should be kept informed.

(4) Unless an interrogation post is established in the corps or division areas, the suspect, concerning whom an arrest report form has been completed by forward CI personnel, will not be re-examined or interrogated until reaching the civilian interrogation center. Here the suspect will be held temporarily during interrogation and examination, following which the CI officer in charge of the interrogation will render a report on the case to the army CI staff with one of the following recommendations as to disposal:

- (a) Sent back to Hq. FUSAG. (Applicable only to enemy agents).
- (b) Handed to CA for prosecution.
- (c) Handed to civil authorities for prosecution in a civil court.
- (d) Handed to civil authorities for internment.
- (e) Released. (to be evacuated by CA).

In all of these cases, except (e), confirmation by the chief CI staff

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officer at army headquarters will be obtained before the order is carried out. Authority to release a suspect may be delegated by army (G-2, CIB) to the CI officer-in-charge of the civilian interrogation center.

3. DISPLACED PERSONS.

a. Displaced persons are civilians, other than French or enemy nationals, who are outside their national boundaries by reason of the war, are homeless, and are to be returned to their own country, e.g. Spaniards in France.

b. Displaced persons who do not arouse suspicion will be evacuated by CA to assembly centers through normal refugee channels. (see Exhibits)

c. Displaced persons who appear suspect will be handled in the same way as refugees coming from enemy lines (see par. 2,d), except that the language problem may make interrogation below an army civilian interrogation center impossible. In such a case, the suspect should be escorted at once to the civilian interrogation center, which should be notified immediately that a special language interrogation is required.

4. ENEMY NATIONALS.

a. General. In the interests of security, it is desirable to intern generally all civilians of enemy nationality. In the forward areas, instructions will be issued to units, FM, CA and CI personnel, and to the civil police (through CA) that all enemy nationals identified as such are to be arrested and taken to the nearest PW collecting point (civilian annex). From there, they will be evacuated along PW channels but will not be detained in the civilian interrogation center if alternative accommodation is available. In any event, they will be transferred as soon as possible to a permanent internment camp, staffed by civil authorities, and supervised, if necessary, by CA staffs.

b. Civilians attempting to conceal the fact that they are enemy nationals will be treated as suspect, and sent back along PW channels for questioning at interrogation posts and at the civilian interrogation center. If it becomes evident that they are enemy agents, the procedure outlined in par. 7, b-d will be followed; otherwise they will be sent to an internment camp.

c. Large numbers of enemy nationals are living underground in France as fugitives from the enemy. Most of these will be found to be friendly to the allied cause, and, if genuine, should not be interned. Each case should be examined individually with the assistance of the local police and informants.

5. ESCAPERS AND EVADERS.

a. All allied military, naval, or air force personnel who arrive within our lines and claim to have escaped from or evaded capture by the enemy will be escorted by MPs to army headquarters immediately, where specially

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qualified personnel made available by IS9 (WEA), SHAEF, will interrogate them to establish authenticity of escape stories and for intelligence gathering purposes. An exception will be made in the case of personnel who claim to have been missing for only a few days, and to come from a neighboring unit; such personnel should be conducted directly to their unit.

b. Escapers and evaders who, in the course of interrogation by IS9 (WEA), claim to have been serving with units present in the theater, will be identified by their unit under arrangements to be made by the army A.C. of S., G-1.

c. Persons whose identity cannot be established by reference to units in the field will, after interrogation by IS9 (WEA), be returned to the UK, where the final check will be undertaken. Ultimate responsibility for determining the bona fides of escapers and evaders does not rest with G-2 staffs, but is a SHAEF responsibility, delegated, in turn, to the specialist officer, IS9 (WEA), serving on the G-2 staffs at this and army headquarters. This officer will have at his disposal special intelligence with which to assist in corroborating details of the escape story.

d. Any persons who arouse suspicion in the course of interrogation by IS9 (WEA) will be turned over to G-2 (CIB) for appropriate action.

6. CIVILIANS VIOLATING SECURITY REGULATIONS.

a. Civilians who violate security regulations (e.g. out after curfew, bearing arms, found in restricted areas, etc.) will be arrested and detained in civil prisons. If preliminary interrogation does not reveal any connection with enemy intelligence services, these civilians will be tried by civil authorities for the violation of security regulations.

b. If preliminary examination indicates possible connection with the enemy intelligence service, the civilian will be sent to the nearest PW collecting point or enclosure (civilian annex) for questioning at the interrogation post. If connection with enemy intelligence service is revealed, the suspect will be treated as an enemy agent, and procedure outlined in par. 7, b-d will be adopted; otherwise he will be returned to civil authorities for trial for security offense.

7. KNOWN AND SUSPECT ENEMY AGENTS.

a. Definitions. Known and suspect enemy agents are:

(1) Persons who are so described to army CI staffs by the army SCI unit, by CI staffs at this headquarters, or in the card index/supplied by this headquarters.

(2) Persons detected in acts of espionage or sabotage.

(3) Persons found in suspicious circumstances which indicate that they may be employed by the enemy intelligence, e.g. those found in possession of radio transmitters, enemy secret codes, intelligence, or materials which might be used for secret writing or sabotage.

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b. Secrecy. It is important to conceal from the enemy the knowledge of the organization and activities of enemy intelligence services which has been obtained from captured agents. Therefore, the fact that an agent has been captured will be communicated to as few persons as possible, and such information will not be released to the press without express authority of the A.C. of S., G-2, this headquarters. Captured agents will be kept segregated.

c. Arrest and Escort. When a known or suspect enemy agent is arrested, immediate report will be made to army CI staffs. The agent will be thoroughly searched immediately, and all articles of whatever nature (including money) will be removed from him and retained by his escort. CI personnel making the arrest will not undertake prolonged questioning, but will limit immediate interrogation of the agent to a few questions which will:

- (1) establish the existence or non-existence of local accomplices,
- (2) obtain urgent tactical information of CI interest,
- (3) extract a brief statement and, if possible, an early confession from the agent which will assist subsequent interrogation,
- (4) clear up points which can only be verified at the place of capture, e.g. identifying premises or persons, locating hidden radio equipment. The agent will not be sent back with other civilian suspects or PWs, but will be escorted by CI personnel to army CI staffs. The escort will take with him all articles (including money), removed from the agent, together with an arrest report form showing the circumstances of the arrest, results of the initial interrogation, and any statement made by the agent. Copies of a standard arrest report form will be issued by this headquarters.

d. Action by Army CI Staffs.

- (1) Immediately upon receipt of notification that a known or suspect enemy agent has been arrested, army CI staffs will inform the army SCI unit, which will at once inform the SCI unit at this headquarters.
- (2) Army CI staffs, in conjunction with the army SCI unit, will undertake only such examination of the prisoner and of the report, documents, and articles which accompany him as is necessary to confirm that the prisoner is an enemy agent. Once this is established, the prisoner (with all documents and articles, including money) will be escorted immediately by CI personnel to this headquarters, unless there are special reasons for retaining him at army headquarters, in which case the matter will be referred at once to this headquarters for decision.

e. Disposal. The final disposal of enemy agents will be decided by the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters in consultation with the FUSAG SCI unit.

8. ORGANIZERS OF RESISTANCE GROUPS.

Civilians believed to have been organizers or key members of resistance groups or allied underground organizations will be escorted by CI personnel to the SF liaison officer at corps. He will escort the alleged

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organizer to the SF detachment at army headquarters. CI personnel below this level will limit interrogation to a few questions to obtain urgent tactical information of CI interest such as the location of recently evacuated offices and buildings, or particulars of suspect enemy agents, collaborators, or reliable informants in the vicinity. Questions involving political considerations will be avoided.

9. MII TEAMS

MII teams will interrogate refugees, displaced persons, etc. only for the purpose of securing tactical and strategic intelligence. Close co-operation will be maintained between CI personnel and MII personnel. CI personnel will notify the nearest intelligence section of suitable persons for MII interrogation when such persons are discovered; likewise MII personnel will notify CI personnel when civilians arouse their suspicion.

10. BRITISH INDIAN NATIONALS.

A special officer detailed by the India Office to interrogate suspect British Indians in the field will be attached to 21 Army Group. A full report of any Indians captured in German uniforms or of suspect Indian civilians held in US areas will be sent at once through this headquarters (Attention: CIB, G-2) to the special officer at 21 Army Group.


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FUSAG CI SOP

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EXHIBIT "A": CHANNELS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES AND SUSPECTS



Refugees and displaced persons of no CI interest.

Suspects, enemy nationals, internees, etc.

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Enemy agents.

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EXHIBIT "B" : FUNCTIONAL CHART

LOCATION

1. TRAFFIC CONTROL POST.

In rear of forward divisional boundaries at bridges, crossroads, etc.

Military police.
1-3 civil police if available.

1. Control military traffic.
2. Keep military routes free of refugees directing these to CA collecting point.
3. Send suspect persons to security control post.

Security control post may be attached to TCP where appropriate.

2. SECURITY CONTROL POST

With TCP, with CA collecting point, or between these two.

1-2 CIC agents.
1-3 civil police

1. Conduct snap checks (as near to 100% coverage as appropriate to number of refugees and tactical situation).
2. Segregate refugees from enemy lines from those rendered homeless by operations. The former will be sent back to div. PW collect. pt. (civilian annex) the latter to CA collecting point.
3. In the case of suspects, arrest report form will be completed and forwarded by escort to div. PW collecting pt. (civilian annex)

Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location of security control post and extent of snap check.

3. CA COLLECTING POINT

In rear of forward divisional boundaries, behind TCPs, along refugee evacuation routes.

Civil police and/or civilians under CA supervision.

1. Refugees will be organized into parties, instructed where to go, and told what roads not to use.
2. Refugees will not be held at these points, but sent to nearest transit area (or advanced transit area)

Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location and number of collecting points.

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
<p>4. <u>PW COLLECTING POINT</u> (Civilian Annex) Division and corps (PW enclosure).</p>	<p>CIC agent available at each at all times.</p>	<p>1. If mobile interrogation post is not available, CIC agent will interrogate civilian suspects or enemy nationals (IPW team may help if not busy with military prisoners). 2. Known or obvious enemy agent will be sent back under CI escort (who takes with him all articles removed from agent) to army CI staff, which must be notified immediately. 3. Suspects will be interrogated for further details to determine their status and, if not released, sent back to PW enclosure of the next higher echelon. At army level, refugees who are still suspect will be sent to the army civilian interrogation center.</p>	<p>1. Prolonged interrogation of enemy agents will not be made below Hq FUSAG level. 2. Refugees cleared of suspicion will be turned over to CA.</p>
<p>5. <u>MOBILE INTERROGATION POST</u> (optional) At civilian annex to PW enclosure.</p>	<p>Mobile interrogators from army or FUSAG, CIC.</p>	<p>1. Provide specialist interrogation to determine true status of suspects. 2. See PW collecting point (civilian annex) functions.</p>	<p>These establishments are optional, but the desirability of properly classifying suspects and obtaining CI information at the earliest moment is self-evident.</p>

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STAFF</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
6. <u>ADVANCED TRANSIT AREA</u> (optional)	Civil organizations, refugees, and CA basic det. (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer) from transit area.	1. Provide food, shelter, and urgent medical attention. 2. Expedite organized evacuation of refugees to transit area.	Optional; established if distance between collecting point and transit area exceeds 20 miles; also in heavily populated area with damaged bldgs. when front is reasonably stable.
7. <u>TRANSIT AREA</u> At corps level, off the main military routes, not more than 20 miles from collecting points or advanced transit areas. Co-ordinated by CA with G-1, G-2 (CI), G-3, G-4 (Traffic) Engineers, and FM at corps.	Civil organizations, refugees themselves, and CA basic det. (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer).	1. Provide food, shelter, and emergency medical care. 2. Expedite return of refugees to their homes or those of other civilians if they are local residents, or organize evacuation to assembly center.	If distance between transit area and assembly center exceeds 20 miles, additional transit areas will be established at 20 mile intervals.
8. <u>ASSEMBLY CENTER</u> In rear areas, (approx army level) off main military routes.	Civil organizations, refugees themselves, and 2-3 CA basic detachments (1) relief and 1 medical officer each).	1. Provide food, shelter, and medical care. 2. Dispose of refugees as appropriate.	

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LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
<p>9. CIVILIAN INTERROGA- TION CENTER</p> <p>Adjacent to, or as annex to, army PW enclosure.</p>	<p>1. Specialist inter- rogators from army & FUSAG CIC res. detts. 2. Allied intelli- gence services (optional). 3. Civil police (ob- tained through CA). 4. SCI personnel as required.</p>	<p>1. Only security suspects will be held here, and only while case is under investigation. 2. Detailed interrogation will be conducted, after which sus- pects will be either: a. Passed to Hq FUSAG (enemy agents only). b. Handed to civil authorities for prosecution in civil c. Handed to CA for prosecution. d. Handed to civil authorities for internment. e. Released.</p>	<p>1. Not a place of permanent de- tention; army CIB must issue written authority for deten- tion exceeding 3 days. 2. Except in case of release confirmation of chief. CIB. army, must be obtained before order is carried out. 3. Enemy nationals (not normally passed thru civilian interroga- tion center) will be sent to internment camp.</p>
<p>10. INTERMENT CAMP</p> <p>Rear areas, norm- ally behind army in Communications Zone.</p>	<p>Staffed by civil authorities, super- vised by CA.</p>	<p>Provide facilities for indefi- nite detention of enemy nation- als and internees, to include food, shelter, and medical care.</p>	<p>Permanent establishment.</p>

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FUSAG CI SOP

ANNEX "H"

LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND SUSPECT ORGANIZATIONS

1. GENERAL. *see para 23, 21 R 2 p.*

Commanding officers will call upon local authorities and police to perform all acts which are necessary for the successful prosecution of operations, and will exact obedience to any orders given for that purpose. CI personnel will bear in mind the importance of gaining the good will of these agencies. Initial contacts between CI personnel and local officials and police will be through G-5 and CA detachments, who have the primary responsibility for maintaining or restoring an efficient administration. After initial contacts are made, CI personnel may deal directly with local authorities on routine CI matters.

2. RELATIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS (OTHER THAN POLICE).

The suspension and appointment of civil officials is a G-5 responsibility. CI personnel will furnish available information regarding the reliability of officials, while CA personnel will consult CI personnel when security considerations arise. CI personnel will arrest only those officials who are considered likely to assist the enemy or those who are required for interrogation, in either case informing the local CA personnel. No arrests will be made by CI on purely political grounds unless specifically requested by CA personnel. When an official is reported to have been "in touch with the Germans", a clear distinction must be made between unavoidable contact and voluntary assistance. Officials will be treated on their individual merits, judged by past records and reliable local information. The following generalizations can be made:

a. All officials who are also members of the collaborationist parties or organizations, mentioned in paragraph 4 below, normally should be deposed and arrested.

b. In enemy occupied countries, officials recently appointed or promoted are suspect; this does not apply where appointment was made by the civil population immediately before arrival of the allied forces.

c. Ex-officials, imprisoned for political reasons, are not necessarily suitable candidates to fill administrative posts from which undesirable officials have been removed, inasmuch as former collaborationists who have turned their coats in expectation of an allied victory have recently been imprisoned in considerable number.

d. Because regional divisions are post-Armistice creations (the normal links between French administration, SIPO, and SD), officials at regional level are more suspect than departmental and local authorities.

3. RELATIONS WITH LOCAL POLICE.

a. Supervision and necessary reactivation of all police forces in

liberated territory is a G-5 responsibility. Supervision of security branches of the local police forces will be carried out in accordance with policies laid down by CI staffs. CI personnel will have free access to police records and will inform CA personnel if it should be necessary to seize such records; in such cases, they will be returned as soon as possible. In judging the reliability of police personnel, each case will be considered individually on the basis of past records and local information.

b. In general, the lower ranks (sergeants and under) in all state and municipal police forces and "Gendarmerie" can be relied upon to maintain law and order, and to enforce security restrictions under the supervision of CA detachments and CI personnel. They cannot be considered as reliable informants for CI purposes until their bona fides have been established individually.

c. The following are suspect:

(1) All ranks of the specially created anti-Communist or anti-Jewish Police.

(2) Higher ranks of the Service des Renseignements Generaux (Police Speciale), the Police de Surete (Police Judiciaire), and the Garde Mobile de Reserve (GMR)

(3) Higher police officials appointed or promoted since the beginning of 1944, i.e. under the DARNAND regime.

(4) Police left in possession of their arms by the German authorities, and actively employed immediately prior to our occupation of an area.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL PARTIES.

a. CI staffs will be responsible for recommending action (including suspension of activities, seizure of records, or arrest of officials and members) to be taken with regard to any political party or organization considered subversive in character or whose activities constitute a menace to the security of the allied forces. Where no danger to security is involved, it will be the responsibility of G-5, consulting with G-2 (CIB), to recommend action to be taken with regard to a political party or organization which tends to promote unrest among the civilian population or to be politically disruptive.

b. No general suspicion attaches to the Legion des Combattants, pro-Vichy parties and organizations organized from the South Zone (French Basic Handbook, 1944 Edit., Part III, Chap. XVI "C"), or Vichy Youth Movements, though the organizers and directors of the latter should be treated with special reserve until their bona fides are established.

c. Suspect parties include all those mentioned in the French Basic Handbook, 1944 Edit., Part III, Chap. XVI "B", together with dependent para-military organizations and youth movements (treated on the same basis as parent organizations). The Breton "Separatists" are equally suspect.

d. Officials and members of suspect parties and organizations will

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be arrested if found to be in one of the following three categories:

- (1) Officials of suspect parties and organizations.
- (2) Members of suspect parties and organizations who have collaborated actively with the German police or German security organizations (SIPO or SD).
- (3) Members of suspect parties and organizations found wearing uniforms or bearing arms.

e. The rank and file of these bodies should be subjected to the maximum possible restrictions, e.g., reporting daily to the police.

f. The arrest, detention, and trial of members of collaborationist parties will, wherever possible, be left to the civil authorities, subject to the general policy adopted by the Supreme Commander towards such authorities.

NOTE: Lists of party members are likely to be found at the headquarters of the "Service Des Renseignements Generaux" in the principal regional towns, as well as in local party offices.

5. HANDLING OF PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

The following classes of pro-axis military or uniformed organizations are likely to be encountered during operations on the continent:

a. Members of para-military organizations of collaborationist political parties of occupied territories:

- (1) "Service d'Ordre" and "Gardes Francaises" or the "Parti Populaire Francais" (PPF).
- (2) "Legion Nationale Populaire" and "Milice Nationale Populaire" of the "Rassemblement National Populaire" (RNP).
- (3) "Legion Franciste" of the "Francistes".
- (4) "Jeunes d'Europe Nouvelle" of "Groupe Collaboration".

b. Auxiliary police who are not part of the recognized civil police, but are recruited from collaborationist organizations and used to cooperate with German police forces in imposing repressive measures on the civil population:

The "Milice Francaise", the most dangerous para-military organization in France.

c. Members of German army formations, recruited from the civil population in occupied territory:

- (1) "Legion des Volontaires Francais" (LVF).
- (2) First Regiment of FRANCE (if they fight for the Germans).
- (3) French "Waffen SS".
- (4) "National-Socialistische Kraftfahrer Korps" (NSKK) (uniformed members, not civilian drivers).
- (5) "TODT" (uniformed members).

d. When any of the above classes are captured, they will be treated as follows:

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(1) Members of groups under categories "a" and "b" will be treated initially as prisoners of war if found in uniform.

(2) Members of groups under categories "a" and "b" will be treated as civilians if not in uniform. Only those taking action against the allied forces will be arrested by the AEF, and treated in accordance with the rules of war.

(3) Persons in category "C" will be treated as prisoners of war.

e. In the initial stages, prior to the establishment of PW camps on the continent, all personnel taken as PW will be evacuated to UK where they will be screened, and those found to be innocuous, and who so desire, will be handed to their national authorities for incorporation in the national forces. When PW camps are established on the continent, the screening will be carried out at the PW camps.

FUSAG CI SOP

ANNEX "I"

COUNTER SABOTAGE

1. COUNTER SABOTAGE OFFICERS.

Headquarters of each army and this headquarters will have on its CI staff an officer specially trained in counter sabotage. These officers will be qualified to advise subordinate organizations regarding the various methods of protection against sabotage and to supervise the investigation of sabotage cases.

2. PREVENTION.

CI staffs will advise on counter sabotage measures but the counter sabotage protection of all materiel and installations will be a responsibility of unit commanders. When they can be made available from other duties, CIC will conduct surveys and inspections of vital points and recommend protective measures.

3. INVESTIGATIONS.

All cases of suspected sabotage will be reported immediately to appropriate CI staffs. The investigation of such cases will be undertaken by CIC. If it becomes apparent that an offense under the Articles of War by military personnel may be involved, PM (Criminal Investigation Division) should be called in.

a. Information from special sources regarding sabotage activities of enemy agents will be made available to CI staffs by SCI units. These units will also advise CI staffs on the action to be taken with respect to such agents.

b. Any captured saboteur or suspected saboteur known or believed to be an enemy agent will be handled in the same manner as other enemy agents (see Appendix "G", par. 7).

4. DISPOSAL OF SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT.

The responsibility for the neutralization or removal of enemy sabotage equipment rests with engineer bomb disposal units. In an emergency, CI personnel may deal with such equipment, but, whenever practicable, they should await the assistance of engineer bomb disposal units. After sabotage equipment is rendered harmless by bomb disposal personnel, it will be handed over to CI personnel for disposal as instructed by CI staffs. New types of sabotage equipment will be delivered, as soon as practicable, to CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

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TWELFTH ARMY GROUP CI SOP

TRAVEL CONTROL

ANNEX "J"

1. GENERAL

6 August 1944

a. References:

- (1) SHAET Administrative Memorandum 17, dated 28 May 1944.
- (2) Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, AG Section, Visitors Bureau, Standing Operating Procedure, 13 July 1944, "Procedure for the Entry, Handling, and Departure of Visitors into the Twelfth Army Group Area on the Continent."

b. Travel between the UK and the continent will be restricted to a minimum and every travel application will be considered individually.

c. As used herein, the term "civilian" will apply to any person not authorized to hold a recognized British or US military, naval, or air force identity card (e.g. AF.B. 2606, AB 64, WD AGO Form No. 65 series, or ETOUSA Enlisted Man's Identification Card). The term "civilian" will not apply to any allied secret agent to be sent to the UK by US agencies such as OSS or SFHQ. These agencies will vouch for and will supply the name and particulars of any such agent to this headquarters (G-2, CIB).

2. CIVILIAN TRAVEL FROM THE CONTINENT TO THE UK.

a. Armies will not accept any private applications from civilians on the continent for permits to travel to the UK. G-5 and G-4 detachments are to publicize this fact.

b. (1) Individuals of the following two categories will be sent to the UK only on the authority of this headquarters (G-2, CIB):

- (a) Known and suspect enemy agents.
- (b) Organizers or key members of resistance groups, allied secret agents, and other persons whose unusual background or experience merits detailed interrogation.

(2) Escorts of the individuals categorized above will prevent communication or contact between such individuals and other persons.

c. After an effective system of travel control has been established on the continent, certain civilians may be brought to the UK in addition to those required for intelligence and security purposes. These additional cases will be limited to key individuals whose presence in the UK is requested by British, US, or allied governmental agencies. Agencies in the field wishing to bring civilians to the UK, other than for intelligence purposes, will refer the request to their parent agency in LONDON which will make an official application to the Passport Control Department of the Foreign Office in LONDON.

d. All civilians travelling from the Twelfth Army Group zone on the continent to the UK will continue to require written authorization from this headquarters (G-2, CIB). (See Exhibit "A").

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c. When it is decided to allow civilians on the continent to make application for permission to travel from the continent to the UK, representatives of the Passport Control Department on the continent will deal with such applications.

3. CIVILIAN AND SERVICE TRAVEL FROM THE UK TO CONTINENT.

a. Civilian or service personnel, other than members of the AEF, will not be permitted to travel from the UK to the continent without a permit issued by the Military Permit Office, LONDON. When necessary, permits will be validated for a return journey to the UK. In such cases, par. 2 above, will not apply to the return trip. Every civilian entering the continent must be in possession of an identity document bearing a photograph. (British civilians will use either a passport, a National Registration Identity Card with photograph, or a DR Form 12 for this purpose. US civilians will use a passport).

b. Permits will not be issued to persons travelling for private reasons. Subject to the usual security check, permits may be issued to the following persons by the Military Permit Office in the UK without reference to this headquarters:

- (1) Distinguished persons nominated by SHAEF.
- (2) Personnel of categories to be designated by this headquarters.

c. (1) Service personnel other than AEF. Except for personnel covered by par 3b above, the sponsoring agency in the UK will secure the approval of this headquarters for the visit before sending the application to the Military Permit Office.

(2) Civilians. Applications for travel by civilians (other than those listed in par 3b above) will be made by the sponsoring agency to the Military Permit Office, which will refer the applications to this headquarters, which will inform the Military Permit Office, LONDON, whether a travel permit should be issued.

d. Armies will be responsible for the supervision and security control of visitors to their zones.

e. Sea and air port CI officers will indorse the permits of all visitors at their port of entry and exit with a statement as to date and place of entry or exit.

EXHIBIT "A"

SERIAL NO.....

AUTHORIZATION TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

WHEN THE PERSON(S) TO WHOM THIS DOCUMENT REFERS IS (ARE) PROCEEDING UNDER ESCORT, IT MUST BE KEPT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ESCORT THROUGHOUT THE JOURNEY AND DELIVERED AT DESTINATION TO THE AUTHORITY INTO WHOSE CARE THE PERSON(S) CONCERNED IS (ARE) DELIVERED.

Date.....

Authority has been granted for the passage of the under-
(number)
mentioned..... person(s) from the Theatre of Operations
to the United Kingdom, subject to the following conditions.

(Delete and initial where inapplicable)

1. Port of Embarkation in the Theatre shall be.....
2. Service escort shall be maintained until the person(s) concerned is/are handed over to the care of.....
at.....
3. The person(s) concerned will remain segregated from the public throughout the journey.
4. The person(s) concerned fall(s) within category.....

Signature of I (b)/CIB Staff Officer

Stamp

Headquarters.....

Surname	Christian Names	Nationality	Date & Place of Birth.	Identity Documents held.